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LABOR, LIBERALISM AND MIAJORITARIAN
DEMOCRACY
ALISTER McALISTER*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A. The Philosophical Question
profound political and legal questions of our day concern
THEthemost
relationship of the individual to the group. Virtually every
major social issue involves the problem of reconciling the authority and
corporate interests of the group with the dignity and separate personality
of the individual. That the group has substantial rights is not to be
denied. Yet the group is not entitled to deem its responsibility to the
individual fully discharged when it has fulfilled its collective obligation
to itself. Our system of constitutional representative democracy includes
a very substantial measure of majority rule. Officials are elected largely
by popular vote, and laws are adopted by a majority vote of our representatives. Yet our system also embodies a great many constitutional
safeguards to prevent majoritarian democracy from degenerating into
a people's tyranny. These include the well-known checks and balances,
the separation of powers, judicial review, and above all, the Bill of
Rights-containing guarantees of personal liberty that were meant to
protect the individual from the abuse of any majority, no matter how
large. Thus our system is at the same time one of majority rule and
minority rights. The never-ending challenge is to maintain the essence of
both, while avoiding the fanatical excesses of anarchy and authoritarianism at each extreme.
The problems of reconciling the competing interests of the individual
and the group are nowhere more dramatically illustrated than in the
area of union political activity. Is the union to be free openly and
unhypocritically to enter the political arena to elect its friends and
defeat its enemies? If so, is the individual union member who does not
agree with the union's political views at liberty to speak and act on behalf
of his own political philosophy, without the slightest suggestion of union
intimidation or coercion? Can the political liberties of both the union
majority and its dissenting minority be consistently honored simultaneously? These questions contain special significance for liberals who
generally consider themselves the friends of organized labor, yet who
also have historically supported individual civil liberties and the right
to be different despite group pressures toward orthodoxy and conformity.
* Member of California Bar.
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B. The Facts of the Dispute
The question of the rights of the individual against those of the group
has seldom been posed with such crystal clarity as in two recent cases
in which the constitutional issue was not actually decided, but only because the Court's majority went to extreme lengths to avoid it. In both
cases the constitutional issue was whether first amendment rights are
violated when purportedly private organizations (to which individuals
are by law compelled to belong in order to hold a certain job) use dues
money to promote political candidates and programs. In International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Street,' six railroad employees sued in a Georgia
state court to enjoin enforcemefit of a union shop contract executed
as authorized according to Section 2 of the Railway Labor Act.2 The
parties stipulated that part of the dues would be used to support ideologies, political programs and candidates in which the plaintiffs did
not believe. In Lathrop v. Donohue,3 an attorney sued to recover dues
paid to the integrated Wisconsin State Bar. He alleged that the State
Bar used his moneys to promote and oppose various legislative objectives
and that he disagreed with the State Bar on many of these issues.
In the Machinists case, the defendants argued that the free speech
issue had already been determined adversely to plaintiffs by Railway
Employes' Dep't v. Hanson,4 which upheld the validity of Section 2 of
the Railway Labor Act,5 which authorizes the union shop in the railway
industry, even in states with "right-to-work" laws. However, the
Court replied that all that Hanson decided was that the union shop, per
se, is valid. Hanson did not rule upon the free speech question because
it was not sufficiently raised in the record. In fact, the Court expressly
reserved decision of this issue.'
In the Machinists case, the Court agreed that the record squarely
presented the free speech issue. Nevertheless, the majority managed to
avoid a decision on this point since it interpreted Section 2 of the
Railway Labor Act' to forbid railway unions from using dissenters'
dues to support political causes or candidates with which the dissenters
disagree.8 The Railway Labor Act does not expressly so forbid unions,
nor does it even make any reference to railway unions' political expendi1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

367 U.S.
64 Stat.
367 U.S.
351 U.S.
64 Stat.
351 U.S.
64 Stat.
367 U.S.

740 (1961).
1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1958).
820 (1961).
225 (1956).
1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1958).
at 238.
1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1958).
at 764-67.
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tures. However, the majority felt that the legislative history of the act
proved that its sole purpose in authorizing compulsory unionism was
to compel employees to pay their share of the costs of collective bargaining and the settlement of disputes. The Court held that the expenditure
of dues for political purposes is not a part of the collective bargaining
process?
The Court then remanded the case to the Georgia state judiciary to
formulate an effective remedy. This remedy, contrary to the original
Georgia decision, may not consist of enjoining enforcement of the
union shop agreement as to the dissenting workers, but may involve
either an injunction against expenditure for political causes of the dues
paid by the complaining employee, or restitution to such employee of
that proportion of his money which the union would have spent for
political purposes. These remedies are available only to employees who
have objected in advance to expenditure of their dues for politics.
Dissent will not be presumed.' 0
In Lathrop v. Donohue, the Court's majority reached even deeper into
the grab bag of techniques for judicial avoidance of constitutional
issues."' It held that the plaintiff's objection to the integrated bar's
expenditure of dues money must fail because his pleadings failed to
raise properly the constitutional issue.Y2 As noted previously, plaintiff
had alleged that the State Bar used his moneys to promote and oppose
various legislative objectives which were not in accord with his
convictions; however, he had neither indicated the nature of the legislation supported by the Bar nor with which particular causes he disagreed.
Thus the Court felt that the Lathrop case was analogous to Hanson;
the free speech issue, not being raised in the record, was left open.
The dissenters all rejected this fastidious approach, so reminiscent of
the technicalities of common-law pleading, and argued that plaintiff's
pleadings fully presented the free speech issue for decision. However,
in both cases justices Frankfurter and Harlan contended that use of
compulsory dues for political purposes violates no first amendment right.
On the other hand, justices Black and Douglas maintained that any
compulsory political contribution is an infringement of first amendment
liberties.
9. Id. at 76S.
10. Id. at 775.
11. Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that avoidance of constitutional issues should "'not
be pressed to the point of disingenuous evasion." Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. at 799

(dissenting opinion). But see, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (birth control appeal
dismissed for lack of justiciable constitutional issue--lack of showing that Connecticut
statutes would be enforced against plaintiffs).
12.

367 U.S. at S42-46.
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GROUP THEORY

A. The Group Process
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's main point in the Machinists case was
unions do and must take part in politics. To the majority's holding
political expenditures are not a part of the collective bargaining
cess, and hence not contemplated by the Railway Labor Act, he
dainfully retorted:

that
that
prodis-

One could scarcely call this a finding of fact ... or even one of law. It is a baseless
dogmatic assertion that flies in the face of fact. . . If higher wages and shorter
hours are prime ends of a union in bargaining collectively, these goals may often
be more effectively achieved by lobbying and the support of sympathetic candidates.
... The notion that economic and political concerns are separableis pre-Victorian....
It is not true in life that political protection is irrelevant to, and insulated from,
economic interests. It is not true for industry or finance. Neither is it true for labor.
It disrespects the wise, hardheaded men who were the authors of our Constitution
and our Bill of Rights to conclude that their scheme of government requires what
the facts of life reject.' 3

Mr. Justice Frankfurter's emphasis is on the interest of the group

rather than that of the individual. From the standpoint of political
science theory, his analysis is closely akin to that of the political pressure
group school of political science. Arthur Bentley, a great but littleknown political scientist, is the modern father of the pressure group
theory.' 4 His 1908 classic" paved the way for all subsequent realistic
studies of the group process. According to Bentley, first, last and
always, the individual is totally insignificant as a social causal agent.
For the purpose of studying group activities, the individual does not
even exist.' 6 Everything which can be learned about government or
legislation by studying the individual can be learned by studying the
group, and much more. To attempt to explain society in terms of
individual mental or moral differences is useless. It is basically a
question of mathematics-only the group counts for anything.'" Since
the individual is discarded, and the group is the all important social
factor, the great task of the social analyst is one of measurement.
13. 367 U.S. at 813-15 (dissenting opinion). (Emphasis added.)
14. His collaboration with John Dewey in a series on mathematics, psychology, sociology
and logic may give a hint as to his general philosophy. Bentley, Behavior, Knowledge, Fact
(1935) ; Bentley, Linguistic Analysis of Mathematics (1932) ; Dewey & Bentley, Knowing and
the Known (1949).
15. Bentley, The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures (1908).
16. Prominent political scientists Latham and Truman join in this denial of the Individual. Latham, The Group Basis of Politics: A Study in Basing-Point Legislation (1952);
Truman, The Governmental Process (1951).
17. Bentley, op. cit. supra note 15, at 109, 215.
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All political process is simply a balancing of one quantity against another,
however evenly matched they may be.
In fairness to this school of thought, it should be pointed out that its
theory's primary purpose is descriptive. It does not generally purport
to deal with morals, metaphysics, religion, ethics, philosophy or value
judgments. That is, it is a tool for e.xplaining what life is really like,
but not necessarily what it ought to be like. It is a foolproof means of
narrating what is happening, not what ought to happen. The major
question is, "Does it work?" and not "Is it true?" or "Is it good?" "Bentley's theory does not help the starving Indian to decide whether he will
eat the sacred cow or not."" Thus it is hard to quarrel with anyone who
uses it merely for descriptive purposes. However, there is always the
danger that a disciple of this descriptive school may carry its spirit with
him when he comes to consider moral and value judgments.10 Bentley
himself was not immune from this error, for he tells us that group
pressures "not only make but also maintain in value the very standards
of justice, truth, or what not that reason may claim to use as its
guides."" But philosopher and theologian join in asking: "Since when
have truth and moral values been determined by majority vote?"
In short, it is undeniably true that unions must engage in politics in
order to protect and advance their interests. It is beyond question that
the individual worker, as an individual, is helpless to contend with the
immense economic and political forces arrayed against him. But this
realistic political analysis hardly settles the moral, philosophical or
constitutional question of the rights of the minority of workers who do
not wish to cooperate with their fellows in political activity. This is
not to argue that our moral judgments should not be influenced by
realistic analysis. On the contrary, our realistic analysis of the group
process goes far towards justifying both the morality and basic legality
of unions per se. Morality should not be divorced from pragmatism.
Nonetheless, a realistic analysis of the group nature of society does not
justify riding roughshod over the basic political conictions of dissenting
workers.
Our pragmatic, sociological analysis of the group may well justify the
union shop, wherein workers are compelled to pay dues to the union,
regardless of their wishes. This may be justified on the grounds of
economic interdependence-all the workers are members of the working
force, and, whether they like it or not, they are all dependent upon
1S. Taylor, Groups and the Political Process: A Study of the Methodology of Arthur
Fisher Bentley, 19S (unpublished thesis in University of Illinois library, 1950).
19. Kels-en, Science and Politics, in What Is Justice? 350-75 (1957).

20. Bentley, op. cit. supra note 15, at 447. (Emphasis added.)
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their relationship to each other and their boss for their very livelihood.
The basic union-worker-employer relationship is inevitable in a complex
industrial society. The union renders services to the worker which
someone must perform lest economic disaster result. At least reasonable
men might so believe. Mr. Justice Black's rationale seems the clearest:
[T]he Hanson case held only that workers could be required to pay their part of
the cost of actual bargaining carried on by a union selected as bargaining agent under
authority of Congress, just as Congress doubtless could have required workers to
pay the cost of such bargaining had it chosen to have the bargaining carried on by,
the Secretary of Labor.... 21

In short, the worker is paying for the cost of a service without
which, it is arguable, he could not survive. He may not like taxes, yet
no one would contend that being compelled to pay them in and of
itself violates the first amendment. Involuntary payment of dues is not
the same as compelled association; the worker is not forced to attend
meetings or to associate with anyone. Of course this reasoning assumes
that unions perform at least a quasi-governmental function, 2 a readily
acceptable concept when one reflects that modern unionism is almost
entirely the product of federal statute and regulation.
B. Legality and Necessity of Union Political Activity
Realistic analysis of the group process teaches us the folly of laws
prohibiting union political activity. The Court has studiously avoided
deciding the constitutionality of the federal statute forbidding corporations and labor unions to make "a contribution or expenditure in connection with any" federal election.23 In United States v. CIO,2 ' the
Court held that the statute did not apply to union periodicals in which
the union informed its members of its views concerning various political
candidates. The basic idea seemed to be that the act was not intended
to apply to union attempts to communicate primarily with its own
members. As a subsidiary point, the Court also intimated that communications financed by subscriptions rather than by general dues
were not within the scope of the statute. Justices Rutledge, Black,
Douglas and Murphy would have stricken the statute as an invalid
abridgment of the first amendment.
The lower federal courts have likewise avoided the constitutional
21. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. at 787 (dissenting opinion).
(Emphasis added.)
22. See text accompanying notes 55-85 infra.
23. Originally adopted as Labor Management Relations Act § 304, 61 Stat. 159-60 (1947),
it is now part of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1958).
24. 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
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issue. In United States v. PaintersLocal 481,23 the statute was construed
not to prohibit a small union that did not own its own newspaper from
using general dues to pay for a political advertisement in a newspaper
of general circulation and a political broadcast over a commercial radio
station. Judge Hand felt that it was impossible to differentiate between
a union-owned publication and an independent paper or radio station.
The only way the small union could communicate to its members by
newspaper or radio would be through buying newspaper space and
radio time.
In United States v. Construction Local 264,"' the court held that
the law was not violated when a union paid three of its own employees
for time spent in a congressional campaign in passing out political
literature, putting up posters, driving voters to register and to vote and
driving a campaign van.
In United States v. UAW, 2 7 the Supreme Court finally decided that
it had found a situation to which the act applied, holding that the law
was intended to prohibit a union from using general dues to sponsor
commercial television broadcasts favoring election of certain candidates
to Congress. Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed that in CIO the union had "merely distributed its house organ
to its own people," whereas in UAW it was charged that they were using
"union funds to influence the public at large to vote for a particular candidate or a particular party."2 It would seem that the UAW case draws
an extremely unrealistic line when it construes the statute to prohibit
union expenditures for electioneering the general public while permitting
the union to spend money to influence its own members. Any television
broadcast would obviously be intended to influence both groups; in any
event both would see it.
However, once again the Court refused to pass on the statute's validity,
pending "the elucidation of a trial,"2 9 preferring to let the district court
first rule on the constitutional issues.3° Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by
25.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

172 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949).
101 F. Supp. 869 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
352 U.S. 567 (1957).
Id. at 589. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 592.
On remand, the district judge interpreted the Courts opinion to mean that the la%,,

was not violated by a broadcast intended primarily to reach union members. The jury found
the UAW not guilty. 41 L.R.R.M. 52 (1957). UAW President, Walter Reuther, and other
union witnesses testified that the Detroit television programs were aimed primarily at UAW

members; any impact on others v.as purely incidental. Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., Washington,
D.C., Counsel, UAW, surmises that, even aside from constitutional questions, the courts will
ultimately adopt the district court's interpretation. Rauh, Legality of Union Political Ec-
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Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Black, dissented, contending that
the district judge's dismissal of the indictment should be affirmed on
the ground that the statute flagrantly violated the first amendment."1
Of course, this statute is out of touch with reality. Certainly no disciple
of Arthur Bentley and the theory of the group process would do anything
more than sneer at a law that attempts to sterilize politically a major
social and economic group. If unions and other organized groups were
really removed from the political arena, who would be left? The most
intimate interests of millions of persons are directly dependent upon the
attainment of their political objectives. Since all realistic political
theorists agree that politics is a group activity, it is ridiculous to prohibit
any legitimate group from political participation. 2
penditures, 34 So. Cal. L. Rev. 152, 160-61 (1961). If so, the law will become an even more
deeply buried dead letter. In fact, how could a union conceivably violate the law, except by
direct contributions to candidates or possibly by political mailings to an exclusively nonunion list? Broadcasts will reach everyone, but this will be legal because their "primary"
purpose will be to influence union members. It would seem, however, that the law was
stripped of any real meaning from the very beginning when interpreted not to apply to
union attempts to communicate with their own members. If unions are effective enough In
influencing their own members, the result of most elections is already a foregone conclusion,
as witnessed by the spectacular success of union-endorsed candidates in 1958, when unions
exhorted their members to the polls under stress of a general economic recession and "rightto-work" proposals in California, Ohio, Washington and Idaho. One wonders if the bill's
Senate spokesman, Robert Taft, who declared that "labor unions are supposed to keep out
of politics," 93 Cong. Rec. 6440 (1947), would have agreed that the law left unions free to
electioneer their own people. (However, Senator Taft was a realist, and after he saw what
the courts had done to the law, he obtained Senate repeal of the "expenditure" prohibition.
S. 249, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), as amended and adopted July 1, 1949. The repeal died in
the House of Representatives.) In any event, the distinction between union electioneering of
its own members and the general public would seem devoid of any meaning in heavily industrialized and unionized communities such as Detroit or Pittsburgh or any coal mining
town.
31. 352 U.S. at 598.
32. Rauh suggests that restrictions on corporate political spending may be more justifiable
than similar restrictions on unions. "Corporations are state-created entities deriving funds
from widespread ownership and business activities. They are not associations of individuals
formed to promote common group interests through social, educational, political and other
means. The only common bond of the stockholders is their hope of profits; no remotely Implied consent is given to the expenditure of these profits for election purposes. The majority
rule in corporate decisions is the rule of the majority of stock voted, not the majority of
individual holders. Nor does the buying public, which brings about these profits, havo any
common interest warranting political utilization of the profits they create. Unlike labor
unions . . . corporations do not enjoy constitutional liberties guaranteed to individuals and
their associations. . . . Union members, unlike corporate stockholders, do have common
social, economic and community interests requiring the common political action for which
they have banded together. Thus, unions and corporations are not comparable entities with
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In short, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's argument of political realism based
upon the nature of the group process is irrefutable, but only if it is used to
prove the right conclusion. It is quite persuasive in contending for the validity of a union shop in a democratic society. It is absolutely unchallengeable if aimed at invalidating the law purporting to forbid union political
expenditures. The unions' right to engage in politics is buttressed by
both the idealism of the first amendment and the Bentley-Frankfurter
political realism which tells us that no significant social or economic
group can be politically sterilized. But the trouble is that Mr. Justice
Frankfurter carries his group process argument too far. M\erely because
it proves the right of a group to active political participation, does not
mean that this group thereby has a right to coerce its dissenting members
likewise to participate, either by financial contribution or otherwise.
Can we not protect both the union and its dissenting members in their
respective political opinions? It is the contention of Justices Black
and Douglas that we can.
Despite his flair for political realism, in both CIO and UAW Mr.
Justice Frankfurter avoided decision of the constitutional issue, even
though it is inconceivable that one who so strenuously believes that
political activity is often the very best way of achieving union economic
respect to the exercise of political activities." Rauh, supra note 30, at 162 n.49. The different
standards of majority rule are true enough. However, one might question whether the purposes are really so very different-both unions and corporations exist primarily to advance

their members' economic interests. To be sure, unions historically have had more of an
all-pervading interest in their members' welfare, education and social life. Also, a union is
community-based, whereas shareholders commonly hail from many states and even foreign
countries and have never even met one another, hence may well lack the common bonds of
union membership. On the other hand, stockholders undoubtedly tend toward membership
in a common social class, with fairly common political philosophies. Of course, as a matter of
political reality, conservative candidates do not need support from corporations per se,
whereas liberals do need union support. Members of the business class have been taught by
their chambers of commerce and trade associations about the need for supporting friendly
candidates. Well-to-do stockholders are far more likely to contribute handsomely to their
political causes than are individual workers to give at all. Union support of friendly candidates is almost a must if they are to have any chance of success, whereas businEs-orientcd
politicians wil normally be adequately supported by individual members of the business and
professional community. Therefore, if preserving freedom of speech depends upon maintaining
a fair balance of power between business and labor support of candidates, there is something to be said for the idea that corporate and union political contributions are constitutionally distinguishable. However, despite these sociological differences between corporations, unions, stockholders and workers, the author would feel distinctly uncomfortable in
asserting that they afford a constitutional basis for prohibiting corporate political expenditures while permitting the same by unions. For an excellent defense of the constitutional
right of corporations to spend money for politics see King, Corporate Political Spending and
the First Amendment, 23 U. Pitt L. Rev. 847 (1962).
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objectives could ever vote to flatly uphold legislation forbidding such
political activity. Justices Black and Douglas, on the other hand, voted
on both occasions to invalidate the act. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's thesis
is unimpeachable; his only mistake is that he ignores it where it is most
applicable and employs it where it does the most violence to the rights
of the minority.
Mr. Justice Black replied that of course a union or other private group
may spend its money for political causes if its members voluntarily
join it and can voluntarily get out of it. Then the dissenter has no
right except to disagree with the majority and to leave the organization
if conditions become bad enough. But it is entirely different "when a
federal law steps in and authorizes such a group to carry on activities
at the expense of persons who do not choose to be members of the
group as well as those who do. ' Since the union shop member must
remain a member or lose his job, any use of his dues for political
purposes violates the first amendment.
And it makes no difference if, as is urged, political and legislative activities are
helpful adjuncts of collective bargaining. Doubtless employers could make the same
arguments in favor of compulsory contributions to an association of employers for
on
use in political and economic programs calculated to help collective bargaining
34
their side. But the argument is equally unappealing whoever makes it.

Mr. Justice Douglas expresses the same thought in different words:
Some forced associations are inevitable in an industrial society. . . . [However,]
once an association with others is compelled by the facts of life, special safeguards
are necessary lest the spirit of the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments be lost and
we all succumb to regimentation .... If an association is compelled, the individual
should not be forced to surrender any matters of conscience, belief, or expression.
He should be allowed to enter the group with his own flag flying, whether it be
religious, political, or philosophical ....35

C. Is the Distinction Between Voluntary and Involuntary Membership
Realistic?
Mr. Justice Black concedes that a voluntary union may spend its
money as it pleases, regardless of the minority's objections.8 However,
some may question whether the rights of a minority to object to expenditure of their dues for the majority's political purposes should
depend upon the voluntariness of their affiliation. It can be persuasively
33. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 789 (1961)
opinion).
34.

Id. at 789-90 (dissenting opinion).

35. Id. at 775-76 (concurring opinion). (Emphasis added.)
36. Id. at 788-89 (dissenting opinion).

(dissenting
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argued that many "voluntary" affiliations are practically obligatory. The
member of an open shop union may, as a practical matter, have no real
choice. In order to maintain the respect of his associates, membership
may be a virtual necessity. For that matter, membership in other
organizations, although not technically compulsory, may be practically
essential because of family ties, community or religious tradition or
economic pressure. Moreover, a Republican worker may sincerely
believe in unionism, as such, and hence will join the union for the sole
purpose of improving his economic position; yet he will be violently opposed to the union's pro-Democratic political sympathies. True, he can
get out of the open shop union, yet were it not for its political activity he
would have no desire to do so. Moreover, since the union by law is the
worker's sole bargaining agent, what it does will have a profound
impact upon his welfare, and no worker can be blamed, in fact he should
be encouraged, for wishing to belong to the union so that he will have
a voice in the formulation of its policies.
It can, therefore, be strongly argued that even in the voluntary
union the dissenting worker should be entitled to proportional restitution when his dues are spent for political purposes. Many of the arguments to the effect that union action is governmental action3 7 apply
just as forcefully to voluntary as to compulsory unions. In fact, the
only difference is the absence of absolute compulsion to join, and, as
shown above, this difference is often more apparent than real. Moreover,
should even a more or less "voluntary" organization, especially one
fraught with as many compulsory and governmental overtones as a
labor union, be entitled to enter forcefully every phase of a man's life?
Is there no freedom somehow, somewhere, from encroaching, allpervading institutionalism?3" To be sure, were this point once conceded,
it is hard to see where it would stop. Would a Republican who is a
Presbyterian by birth, family association, social ties and perhaps almost
by economic necessity, be entitled to proportional restitution of his
tithe if his church were to endorse minimum wage laws, to which he is
opposed, or even if it contributed money to a Democrat's campaign?
Well, perhaps this only illustrates the limits of the law-it cannot
provide a remedy for every wrong! Even so, it should not be forgotten
that the practical necessities that often dictate affiliation with a
"voluntary" union are today largely governmentally created-favorable
labor laws and Government support have strongly assisted in the formation of strong unions with substantial responsibility for the worker's
37. See text accompanying notes 55-85 infra.
38. See generaUy Whyte, The Organization Mlan (1956).
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welfare, thus encouraging union membership-whereas in the case of
the church or social organization the "necessities" compelling membership are mostly the product of purely private pressures.
D. MajoritarianDemocracy and the Integrated Bar
It may be argued that the minority in any democratic organization
should submit to the will of the majority. Again, anyone who believes in
the Bentley-Frankfurter realistic analysis of the group process will
recognize that group action cannot be stymied merely because of a
minority's opposition. The group is an entity and it must stand as an
entity. But "majoritarian" democracy does not sum up the whole of
western democratic theory and practice. The "corporate veil," so to
speak, must be sufficiently pierced to protect the minority from the
oppression of the majority. This is the whole purpose of the many formal
and informal checks and balances in our constitutional system. It is the
raison d'6tre of the Bill of Rights. Conservatives have long been concerned over the abuses of majoritarian democracy." Yet in the Machinists
and Lathrop cases it is the most liberal members of the Court who were
the most concerned over the abuses of majority power.
Mr. Justice Douglas expressed a special interest in this problem in
Lathrop in which he opposed the whole concept of the integrated bar. 40
He quoted Guthrie, 4 who charges that under the integrated bar
the traditions and ethics of our great profession would be left to the mercy of mere
numbers officially authorized to speak for us! This would be adopting all the vices
of democracy without the reasonable hope ... of securing any of its virtues. It would
be forcing the democratic dogma of mass or majority rule to a dangerous and pernicious extreme.
Although in political democracy the rule of the majority is necessary, the American
recognition of the imperative necessity of
system of democracy is based upon the 42
limitations upon the will of the majority.
Mr. Justice Douglas is deeply troubled over the whole problem of
compulsory association. 43 In fact, he is apparently the only member of
the Court who believes the integrated bar to be invalid per se. 4" He
39. See generally de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1945).
40. 367 U.S. at 880-83 (dissenting opinion).
41. Guthrie, The Proposed Compulsory Incorporation of the Bar, 4 N.Y.L. Rev. 223
(1926).

42. Id. at 234-35. (Emphasis added.)
43. His concern was expressed in another context in his dissent to the holding of Public
Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 468 (1952), that a "captive audience" could validly
be subjected to radio programs on street cars and busses.
44. All the state decisions have upheld the integrated bar. Herron v. State Bar, 24 Cal.
2d 53, 147 P.2d 543 (1944); Carpenter v. State Bar, 211 Cal. 358, 295 Pac. 23 (1931);
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i 45 the
points out that while in Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson
union shop was held valid on the ground that those who enjoy the
fruits of collective bargaining may reasonably be compelled to contribute to its costs,"6 the integrated bar's principal purpose is not to
perform economic services for its members but rather to police the
members of the profession, and to promote legislation favored by the
majority of the bar. True, the integrated bar performs some economic
services for its members by establishing minimum fee schedules and
fighting unauthorized practice of law by laymen, "yet this is a far cry
from the history which stood behind the decision of Congress to foster
the well-established institution of collective bargaining as one of the
'4 7
means of preserving industrial peace.
Mr. Justice Douglas reminds us that none of the bar's objectives are
truly "nonpartisan." Even when the bar is working for statutory
revision or procedural "reform" there are many lawyers who are opposed
to it.4 s Right or wrong, that is their privilege.
Once we approve this measure [the integrated bar], we sanction a device where

men and women in almost any profession or calling can be at least partially regiPetition of Fla. State Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1949); In re Mundy, 202 La. 41, 11
So. 2d 398 (1942); Ayres v. Hadaway, 303 Mich. 5S9, 6 N.W.2d 905 (1942); In re Platz, C0
Nev. 296, 10S P.2d SSS (1940); In re Scott 53 Nev. 24, 292 Pac. 291 (1930); In re Gib-on,
35 N.M. 550, 4 P.2d 643 (1931); Kelley v. State Bar, 143 Okla. 2S2, 293 Pac. 623 (1931);
Lathrop v. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 NAV.2d 404 (1960). See also Application of Mont.
Bar Ass'n, 368 P.2d 158, 162 (Mont. 1962) (dictum); Comment, 30 Fordham L. Rev.
477 (1962). However, only in Lathrop were first amendment objections raised. In In
re Integration of the Bar, 249 Wis. 523, 25 NAV.2d 500 (1946), the court had earlier noted
the free speech problem on its own motion in declining to order integration, stating that
integration would require it to censor the budgets and activities of the bar after integration,
and that "it requires a very short look at some of the possible activities of the bar to
make it dear that this court would have to insist upon scrutinizing every activity for which
it is proposed to expend funds derived from dues, and that a series of situations w'ould
arise that would be embarrassing to the relations of bench and bar." Id. at 529-30, 25
N.W.2d at 503. However, in Lathrop the court dismissed the first amendment problem,
stating: " e are of the opinion that the public welfare will be promoted by securing and
publicizing the composite judgment of the members of the bar . . . on measures directly
affecting the administration of justice and the practice of law. The general public and the
legislature are entitled to know how the profession as a whole stands on such type of
proposed legislation. This is a function that an integrated bar, which is as democratically
governed and administered as the State Bar, can perform much more effectively than can a
voluntary bar association." Lathrop v. Donohue, supra at 239-40, 102 N.W.2d at 409.
45. 351 U.S. 225 (1956) (Douglas, J.).
46. This is the "free-rider" argument in judicial language.
47. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. at SS0 (dissenting opinion).
48. Jeremy Bentham's nineteenth century vitriolic attack on the lawyer' vested interest
in the legal status quo could be justifiably repeated today, but this also proves that procedural reform is far from noncontroversial. Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence (1827).
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mented behind causes which they oppose. I look on the Hanson case as a narrow
exception to be closely confined. Unless we so treat it, we practically give carte
blanche to any legislature to put at least professional people into goose-stepping
brigades. . . .While the legislature has few limits where strictly social legislation is
concerned .. .the First Amendment applies strictures designed to keep our society
40
from becoming moulded into patterns of conformity which satisfy the majority.

III. COMPULSORY DUES

AND TAXES

Justices Harlan and Frankfurter contend that merely taking a man's
money does not violate his freedom of speech. 0 This would be a tough
idea to sell to a union shop member who is also a Republican precinct
committeeman and who is compelled to contribute to the Democratic
campaign chest. Nonetheless, they make a forceful argument. Their
principal analogy is the use by government of tax revenues to promote controversial ideas51 (a tacit admission that union action is government
action, since no one doubts that collecting and spending taxes are government functions). The states use tax money to buy school textbooks and finance instruction with which many taxpayers are in violent disagreement.
The federal government expends tax moneys to propagandize ideas
opposed by many taxpayers. Government agencies, at public expense,
lobby for their controversial programs in Congress. The United States
Information Office expresses many views rejected by countless taxpayers. The public relations officer of every government department does
likewise. Yet the conscientious objector cannot object to the study of
military science under the ROTC program even though such study
offends his religious scruples, 52 nor can he "refuse to contribute taxes
49. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. at 884-85 (dissenting opinion).
50. Mr. Justice Frankfurter also compares this case to Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947), in which the Court sustained the state's power to subsidize bus service to
parochial schools. He contends that it makes no difference whether Everson is justified on the
ground that there was no establishment of religion, "or whether it be more forthrightly
stated that the merely incidental 'establishment' was too insignificant." Lathrop v. Donohue,
367 U.S. at 818 (dissenting opinion). Here, likewise, he feels the amounts used for politics
may be de minimis. The Everson analogy seems farfetched. The trouble with it is that de
minimis was not Everson's basic rationale, but rather the "child welfare" theory, or the
distinction between invalid, direct aid to religion, and presumably valid indirect aid to religion which directly and primarily benefits the child. Besides, and more to the point, if a
small amount of the dissenter's money can be spent for politics, why not a larger sum?
Moreover, should the de minimis doctrine, properly applicable to commercial cases involving nothing more important than money, ever be applied to a case where first amendment principles are at stake?
51. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 851-52, 857, 860 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring);
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 808 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
52. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
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in furtherance of a war . . . or . . . any other end condemned by his
conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment
has never yet 3been so exalted above the powers .. of the agencies of
government. 11
One wonders if these are apt analogies. After all, is it not an absolute
practical necessity for government to do all these things? Certainly
there must be an interchange of views between executive and legislative
branches. It may be said that this is the propagation at public expense
of ideas rejected by many taxpayers, hence arguably a violation of
their freedom of speech; yet without it government could not exist.
Self-preservation is a basic human instinct; society must have the right
to protect itself against enemy attack, even if pacifists are thereby
offended. Certainly education is a public necessity, yet, inevitably, ideas
will be taught which many people reject. The teaching of the theory of
biological evolution will deeply offend many religious sects. Some theories
of history, economics and sociology studied in the schools will evoke the
most violent reactions from segments of the populace. However, if
these instances of governmental propagation of ideas constitute indirect
infringements of freedom of speech, then we will simply have to learn to
live with them, for the alternative is anarchy. On the other hand, it
certainly cannot be maintained that society will disintegrate if unions and
other organizations cannot compel their unwilling members to contribute
funds to promote political causes in which they do not believe. There
is no social necessity for this kind of arrangement, hence any comparison
to the typical purposes for which tax money is spent is thoroughly
superficial.
Moreover, these tax analogies overlook the exact nature of what the
union is doing. The union is spending dues money to finance the campaigns of candidates for public office. Even Justices Frankfurter and
Harlan do not suggest that Congress may appropriate money for the
direct, express purpose of creating an election campaign fund for the
purpose of re-electing the President of the United States. Yet that is
exactly what many unions are doing with dues money collected from
involuntary members. To make glib but transparently superficial comparisons with government expenditures for education, national defense and public information programs is but to beg the question. Mr.
Justice Black puts it well:
Probably no one would suggest that Congress could, without violating . . . [the
first] amendment, pass a law taxing workers, or any persons for that matter (even
lawyers), to create a fund to be used in helping certain political parties or groups
53.

Id. at 268 (concurring opinion).
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favored54 by the Government to elect their candidates or promote their controversial
causes.

To be sure, it may be argued in rebuttal that most congressional appropriations serve a political purpose. Farm subsidies, power dams,
reclamation projects and defense contracts all have a substantial impact on the voter. But from both the legal and philosophical points of
view, the political purpose is incidental to the basic objective of serving
the nation's best interests. There would seem to be a basic distinction
between an appropriation with a valid public purpose entirely aside from
political aggrandizement, even though it incidentally contains substantial
political implications, and an appropriation with no conceivable objective except to maintain a given political party in power. As realists, we
recognize that no effective public servant can ever afford to forget.
the political implications of anything he does; we only have a right to
expect that our laws have a valid basis above and beyond the mundane
considerations of political survival. Regardless of the political motivations that stand back of virtually all government appropriations,
reasonable men may well believe that government could not function
effectively without them. This is not true of an appropriation with the
sole and express purpose of promoting the favored political party.
IV.

Is UNION ACTION GOVERNMENT ACTION?

A. The Basic Question
In order to sustain the dissenting union members' position, union
political action must be held to constitute governmental action. As
a generality, constitutional limitations do not apply to private organizations, but only to government. 55 This is a point that is often overlooked
by civil-liberties minded laymen. A church, for example, may condemn
a book as immoral and forbid its members to read it. Many a layman of
a different religious, moral or literary persuasion may denounce the
church's action as "unconstitutional," or at least as "un-American,"
without realizing that the church is only exercising its own constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech and religion. True, the author,
the publisher and the book dealers may be injured by the church's
edict. Nevertheless, whether it is wise or unwise in its opinions, the
church is not a public body. It is not subject to the limitations of the
54. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 788 (1961) (dissenting
opinion).
55. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948);
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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constitution; rather it is entitled to its guaranties, including the freedom
to say what it pleases about allegedly immoral books.-"
However, the question is whether a labor union, especially when
operating under a union shop contract, is the same kind of private
organization as a church., 7 True, technically a union is not a governmental
entity. It is not a state or local government, nor is it a formal branch
of the federal government. But if we look to its substance rather than
to its form, we can readily see that a union does in fact exercise
governmental or at least quasi-governmental functions and powers. It
is simply shutting one's eyes to reality to say that an organization is not
a government and, therefore, is not subject to constitutional limitations
on the exercise of power by government when in fact it exercises greater
power in many people's lives than all the other governmental and nongovernmental institutions combined. Such an organization, if not a de
jure, is most assuredly a de facto government. If not, then the Constitution's application is withheld because of a shallow and hypocritical
label.
B. The Contract Theory and Free Agency
Summers3s and Williams, 2 two of the most outstanding authorities
in the field, have long contended that unions are governments and should
56. Many a liberal would concede the church's constitutional right, but would still de-

nounce its exercise of that right as poor policy. Query: Does even this "liberal" h pothesis not miss the point of freedom of expression? If the message of constitutional
liberalism is that every idea must fight it out in the "market place of ideas," what is so very
wrong with a church entering the fray with the objective of combating "immoral" ideas?
Maybe some ideas in books are immoral and need to be fought. After all, the church has
its own obligations to its own convictions and to its own members. To argue that the church
should keep quiet in order to protect the "spirit" of freedom of e.xprcfion for the author
and readers of an "immoral" book, is but to deny freedom of speech to one group in the
guise of guaranteeing it to another. To be sure, there are potential hazards to free spa..ch
in the actions of private groups. If all members of a large church were to follow its literary
dictates like sheep, one might begin to wonder just where the true seat of power was located.
But this seems a rather farfetched hazard in the context of our pluralistic, individualistic
society, where hardly anyone feels he has to do anything just because he is told
to do it,and where no one private group is powerful enough to dominate our culture. The
private action that seems to pose the greatest threat to free speech is the economic boycott
of a businessman because of disapproval of his political views. Yet, -strangely, many liberals
seem not in the least disturbed over the suggestion of boycotting Richfield Oil Company for
its sponsorship of allegedly ultra right wing public rallies.
57. For an argument by J. Albert Woll, AFL-CIO General Counsel, that labor unions
are essentially private organizations, at least for purposes of their political activities, see
Woll, Unions in Politics: A Study in Law & the Workers' Needs, 34 So. Cal. L. Rev. 130,
138-41 (1961).
58. Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1049 (1951).
59. Williams, The Political Liberties of Labor Union Members, 32 Texas L. Rev. 326 (1954).
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be treated as such. Williams points out that the courts have often
reasoned 60 that a union is an unincorporated benevolent association,
hence they have concluded that it may set up any conditions of membership it pleases, under the ordinary common-law rules affecting voluntary
associations, just as may churches, social groups and political clubs.0 1
This is the contract theory-the theory that the [union] constitution is a contract,
and if the prospective union member accepts membership, he accepts these terms.
It is this omnipotent analogy that leads the courts astray. It is true that unions
have resemblance to fraternal organizations, churches, political clubs and the like. But

it has now been often enough said that unions are powerful political and economic
governments. We make them exclusive bargaining representatives by statute thereby
giving them far-reaching control over a critical segment of the members' livestheir working conditions and opportunity to earn a living.
With such power there must be responsibility-governmental responsibility, if
you will. ....

62

One would think the contract theory would have been discarded by
now since it was completely discredited long ago. In the case of the
union shop, at least, the "contract" is a decidedly coerced one, and
every student of contracts or of constitutional law should be suspicious
of the validity of a coerced agreement to relinquish constitutional
liberties.63 In addition, it is just a trifle ironic to see labor unions rely
on the contract theory-a theory which in essence is but a revival of the
old doctrine of liberty of contract that was long employed to suppress
union-sponsored labor legislation.
In Lochner v. New York,6" the Court invalidated a New York maximum hours statute that limited bakery employees to a sixty-hour week
and a ten-hour day. The majority held that statute to be an unjustifiable
interference with the liberty of contract which it read into the fourteenth amendment.6 5 Workers and their employers should have the
60. Usually in union expulsion cases.
61. Williams, supra note 59, at 828-29.
62. Id. at 829. (Emphasis added.) Accord, Baldwin, Union Administration & Civil
Liberties, 248 Annals 54 (1946); Summers, Disciplinary Procedures of Unions, 4 Ind. & Lab.
Rel. Rev. 15, 30 (1950) ; Taft, Democracy in Trade Unions, 1946 Am. Econ. Rev., Papers &

Proceedings 359; Wollett & Lampman, The Law of Union Factionalism-The Case of the
Sailors, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 177, 198 (1952).

63. But see Regan v. New York, 349 U.S. 58 (1955), in which an alternate ground for
affirmance of a contempt conviction for refusal to testify before the grand jury is the tentative proposition that a policeman can validly agree to waive a statutory immunity to prosecution for crime disclosed in testimony concerning bribery under pain of losing his job and being
disqualified from future employment with the city.
64.

198 U.S. 45 (1905).

65.

Id. at 64.
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right to contract to work as long as they please. This is true equality
and the general public has no concern with such contracts.
5 and Adair
In Coppage v. Kansas,"
v. United States, 7 the Court
struck down state and federal enactments forbidding any employer
from requiring that his employees agree not to become or remain union
members as a condition of their employment. Again the majority declared that this legislation offended its conception of liberty of contract
which it had discovered in the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. After all, it is axiomatic that the employer has
the right to hire anyone he pleases under any conditions he can manage
to negotiate with his employees. Likewise, the employee is at liberty
to work for anyone he pleases under any conditions he and his
employer can agree upon. If the employee does not wish to agree not
to join the union, he remains perfectly free to quit any employer who
requires such a condition.
The only thing wrong with this theory was that it overlooked the
immense disparity in bargaining power between the employer and the
individual worker. Free agency-a glorious religious and political
ideal-is but a hypertechnical, legalistic theory when interjected into
the employment relationships of a million-dollar corporation and the
individual wage earner. The only way the worker's freedom of choice
can become anything more than a misty theological doctrine is through
union with his fellow workers.
In an historic dissent, Mr. Justice Holmes pointedly reminded his
brethren:
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country
does not entertain. . . . The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics ....
[A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular
economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to
the State or of laissez faire.6s

And again,
In present conditions a workman not unnaturally may believe that only by belonging to a union can he secure a contract that shall be fair to him..
.. If that belief,
whether right or wrong, may be held by a reasonable man, it seems to me that it may
be enforced by law in order to establish the equality of position between the pirlies
in which liberty of contract begins.09

The Coppage and Adair rationale was utterly repudiated in Lincoln
66. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
67.

20S U.S. 161 (1908).

63. Lochner v. New Yrork, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (dissenting opinion).
69. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1915) (dissenting opinon). (Emphasis
added.)

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Co.,7"

[Vol. 31

Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal
sustaining state
"right-to-work" laws against union contentions that they constituted an
unconstitutional deprivation of liberty of contract. "Right-to-work"
laws forbid employers to fire or refuse to hire workers on the grounds
of either union membership or nonmembership. They are often advocated
by employer groups who formerly insisted religiously on the sanctity of
liberty of contract, yet such laws certainly abridge liberty of contractand in both directions-for they outlaw both the union shop, in which
all workers must join the union or be fired, and the yellow-dog contract,
under which the worker must stay out of the union or be fired. They are
usually opposed by labor groups, who formerly denounced the judicial
doctrine of liberty of contract as a device designed to enslave the workers,
but who in Lincoln Fed. attempted to resurrect this dead doctrine and
muster it into the service of compulsory unionism. However, the Court
apparently felt that the doctrine should stay dead, regardless of the
identity of its mourners.
For us, the significant point is that the "contract theory" of union
membership is nothing more than "liberty of contract," albeit in rather
unfamiliar garb. The same arguments that led to the demise of liberty
of contract as applied in Lochner, Coppage and Adair, apply just as
effectively to the contract theory. If the worker's ridiculously unequal
bargaining position, relative to his employer, translated his "liberty of
contract" into nothing more than a grim joke, the union member's
proportionately unequal bargaining position, relative to his union, just
as surely undermines the contract theory of union membership. In either
case, it is the helpless individual versus the all-powerful group. It can
no more be rationally argued that the worker has any meaningful
choice in his "acceptance" of the union constitution than he had any
real freedom of choice in his "acceptance" of the employer's contract.
Where compulsory unionism prevails, this should be so clear as to require no argument. But even where there is an open shop it strains the
imagination to think of the worker "bargaining" over the terms of his
union membership. With the open shop, union membership may be so
desirable, either because of social relationships or the desirability of
having a voice in the government of an organization that is the worker's
exclusive bargaining agent, that the "voluntary" membership is practically obligatory. In short, both liberty of contract and the contract
theory amount to nothing more than shrewd and legalistic attempts to
employ a formalistic freedom of choice as a weapon to destroy any
true and realistic liberty.
70.

335 U.S. 525 (1949).
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Summers concisely concludes:
If unions are recognized as a form of industrial government, then the rights of a
-member within the union should be equivalent to the rights of a citizen within a
democratic society. Unions should have no more power to punish individuals for
exercising free speech than civil governments ...

In the constitutional limitations on the power of government, the courts can find
familiar guides for marking the minimum of decency which union discipline must
mnintain. 7

C. Union Expulsion and Political Endorsements
In Mitchell v. International Ass'n of Machhists,7 the California
District Court of Appeal recently applied the foregoing reasoning to
justify judicial reinstatement to union membership of two workers
following their outrageous expulsion by the union. The court concluded
that a union is not a private organization and that its actions are
actions of government and hence subject to constitutional limitations.
Mitchell and Mulgrew were IAM members, whose employer, Lockheed
Aircraft, had a union shop agreement with IAM. They were tried by the
union on the charge of conduct unbecoming a member, found guilty as
charged, and expelled from the union. Their offense was that in the 1958
California general election they had made television speeches and issued
press releases in favor of initiative Proposition 18, a "right-to-work"
measure which would have outlawed both closed and union shops. 3
They did not purport to represent the union; however, they were aware
that the union had urged all members vigorously to oppose adoption.
The trial court denied their petition for a writ of mandamus compelling
their reinstatement, finding that their jobs at Lockheed were not
jeopardized by their union expulsion. 4
In reversing the trial decision, the court relied upon both Williams
and Summers, and declared:
It would seem proper to begin by dispelling two troublesome illusions. The first is
that unions are purely voluntary organizations like Republicans, Democrats, Elks,

and church groups. A modem labor union, both in structure and in function, bears
little resemblance to other voluntary associations ...
Unions can be distinguisbed
from other voluntary organizations in many respects. Most importantly, a large
part of their power and authority is derived from government. . . . Further, they
are not primarily social groups which require homogeneous views in order to retain
71. Summers, supra note 5S, at 1074. (Emphasis added.)
72. 196 Cal. App. 2d 796, 16 Cal. Rptr. 313 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
73. Proposition 1 was defeated by a vote of 3,070,37 to 2,079,975. Secretary of State
Jordan, State of California Statement of Vote General Election, November 4, 195S (1953).
74. See note 72 supra.
75. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
76. See note 5S supra and accompanying text.
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smooth functioning. They are large, heterogeneous groups, whose members may agree
on one thing only-they want improved working conditions and greater economic
benefits. The union's power, when considered together with its source, imposes upon
it reciprocal responsibilities toward its membership and the public generally that
other voluntary organizations do not bear....
Secondly, it cannot be assumed that the only value in membership is job retention.
Even though a member may keep his job when expelled, his expulsion causes him to
suffer a detriment the apprehension of which would no doubt have a coercive effect
on the membership. First of all, it is not clear what his rights would be if he quit
his job to seek another, at least in intrastate commerce. Also, he has a financial
stake in the strike fund, perhaps a pension fund, and other funds to which he has
contributed. Further, he is denied the right to participate in his union "government."
Although the union is required by law to represent him impartially . . .he has no
voice in how that representation is to be conducted. In addition, there are frequently
for a non-member working among members that cannot be
social ramifications
77
overlooked.

The court also cited Archibald Cox"8 to the effect that it is not sufficient for the union to argue that, although a man may have a constitutional right to talk politics, he has no right to be a union member. The
point is that if people's economic well-being depends upon their entertaining the "right" views, or at least keeping quiet about the "wrong"
ones, most of them will quickly learn to conform, and we shall become
a nation of pitiful puppets, dancing to whatever political tune is preferred by the dominant economic interest groups. Indeed, just where
would we be if all the strong economic, groups took the attitude that
although their members may have a right actively to entertain unpopular
political views, they have no corresponding right to remain members of
the group? With most of the millions of public employees already politically sterilized by the federal Hatch Act 79 or its local equivalents, if
the large, so-called "private" occupational groups are to insist on
political conformity as a condition of membership, whence comes the
continued originality and vitality of new and controversial ideas so
essential to our free political system's viability? Certainly there are already enough formal and informal discouragements to political activity
to make one ponder. Although in most states political activity by a
77.

196 Cal. App. 2d at 799-800, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 814-15.

78. Law and the National Labor Policy 111 (1960).
79. 54 Stat. 767 (1940), 5 U.S.C. § 118i (1958). This act prohibits political activities by
federal employees, upon pain of discharge. United Pub. Workers of America v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75 (1947), sustained it over first amendment and fifth amendment due process
objections, Justices Black, Douglas and Rutledge dissenting. The act's additional prohibition
of political activity by state employees whose principal employment relates to an activity
financed in whole or in part by federal loans or grants, 54 Stat. 767 (1940), 5 U.S.C.
§ 118k(a) (1958), was upheld in Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S.
127 (1947), Justices Black and Rutledge dissenting.
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teacher is legally permitted, local custom often frowns upon it as too
"controversial." The teacher in a private school will often be discouraged
or forbidden from politics either because of the school's reprehensible
fear that controversy may frighten away contributors or because the
teacher belongs to the "wrong" political party. To be sure, such an
attitude is utterly degrading to a college or university-whose highest
function always ought to be the quest for truth, regardless of consequences-but it exists nonetheless. The corporate executive is often
likewise discouraged from anything more controversial than boy scout
or community chest activity. This craven fear of taking unpopular stands
has even infiltrated the legal profession, historically the greatest single
source of politically conscious citizens; in some large law firms politics
by junior members is definitely taboo. Who, then, really is free?
Well, at least the California court has done what it could to draw the
line against union explusion for the attempted exercise of one's
constitutional liberties. Had this case gone the other way, one might well
wonder where the line would be drawn-or whether any line would be
drawn at all. Would a Nixon campaign worker be safe from expulsion
by a rabidly pro-Democratic union?80
D. Government Action-Compulsion and Permission of the
Union Shop
Mr. Justice Frankfurter argued that even if plaintiffs were correct
had Congress ordered a union shop, they would have had no case where
Congress has merely authorized it. Thus, it is contended that government action is lacking where Congress merely permits, rather than
compels, private action."'
One simple answer to this reasoning is to point to the fact that modern
trade unionism, be it compulsory or voluntary, is largely the product
of federal statute and encouragement. It would seem that there is such
substantial federal involvement in union affairs that virtually anything
a union does is government action.
But perhaps an even more compelling answer is to be found in
SO. If a union is in effect a government, it should be too clear for argument that an
integrated bar is likewise governmental. This follows logically where membership in the
bar is an absolute prerequisite to service as an officer of the court, and where the bar is
authorized to sit, in effect, both as prosecutor and trial court in disciplinary proceedings.
31. This argument is offered rather half-heartedly; in the rest of his substantial dissent,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter silently assumes that government action is involved, and his major
arguments are directed towards proving the validity of the union action, even though it he
government action. In fact, the underlying implicit assumption running through the entire
case seems to be that union action ir government action.
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Shelley v. Kraemer, 2 holding that judicial enforcement of racial restrictive covenants in private deeds constitutes invalid state action in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and
Barrows v. Jackson,83 holding that the judicial award of damages
for breach of such a covenant again constitutes invalid state action.
We know that union contracts, as well as union expulsions and many
other official union acts, are enforceable in court, if otherwise valid.
What then is the difference between judicial enforcement of privately
negotiated racial convenants and judicial enforcement of union contracts or other union acts involving a very substantial degree of public
involvement? In either case, judicial recognition and enforcement of
the allegedly "private" arrangements is eventually necessary for their
enforcement. Indeed, it would seem that the racial convenant is far
more "private" and less "governmental" than the union's political
activities. In fact, the Court in Shelley went so far as to concede that
the privately negotiated racial covenant was valid,84 but it was nonetheless unenforceable because enforcement would require action by
an organ of the state, the judiciary. It is doubtful that what the union
is doing can be characterized at any stage as anywhere near so
"private" as the racial covenant between strictly private parties. In
any event, such union contracts are effective only if judicially enforceable, and the Shelley analogy actually seems to make an even stronger
case for the dissenting worker than the oppressed Negro.8"
V. BALANCING AWAY THE FIRST AMENDMENT

In recent years, free speech disputes have been largely centered in the
areas of Communism and national security. In this area the most bitter
controversy has concerned whether the Court, and indeed society itself,
should adopt a so-called balancing test, in which the validity of any
restriction on free speech is tested by balancing society's right of selfpreservation against either the individual's or society's interest in
unfettered free speech. Even if the balancing test is accepted, there is
always a further dispute over which way the balance tips. Apparently,
a majority of the Court accepts the -balancing test, as propounded
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter. Justices Black and Douglas, however,
82. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
83. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
84. 334 U.S. at 13.
85. Cf. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), wherein invalid
state action was found in Delaware's merely "permitting" a restaurant lessee of state property to refuse to serve a Negro. Certainly, state property was being used, thereby furnishing
the Court with an even more solid element upon which to base its finding of state action.
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reject this criterion, maintaining that the first amendment freedoms are
absolute." It is not perfectly clear whether Mr. Chief Justice Warren and
Mr. Justice Brennan reject the balancing test in principle, or whether
they simply believe that the balance almost always lies in favor of
freedom.S7 In any event, they almost invariably stand with Justices
Black and Douglas.
The argument in favor of the balancing test is, of course, strongest
where national security is at stake. However, it appears that this test
has not been confined to national security, but that it is applied in virtualiy all fields where free speech is in issue. This is pointed out in the
integrated bar case by Mr. Justice Black, who vigorously denounces the
Frankfurter-Harlan position, and to a lesser extent the majority's holding, as simply another application of the balancing test which has
customarily been employed in national security cases.
The "balancing" argument here is identical to that which has recently produced
a long line of liberty-stifling decisions in the name of "self-preservation." The interest
of the State in having "public expression of the views of a majority of the lawryers"
by compelling dissenters to pay money against their will to advocate -views they
detest is magnified to the point where it assumes overpowering proportions and
appears to become almost as necessary a part of the fabric of our society as the
need for "self-preservation." On the other side of the "scales," the interest of lawyers
in being free from such state compulsion is ... characterized as being of a purely
"chimerical nature." As is too often the case, when the cherished freedoms of the
First Amendment emerge from this process, they are too weightless to have any
substantial effect upon the constitutional scales. .

.

. This case . . . shows that the

balancing test cannot be ad will not be contained to apply only to those "hard"
cases .. .involving the question of the power of this country to preserve itself.88
If the balancing test is to be applied to this type of case, the Court
can justify any first amendment infringement. It is true that Mr. Justice
Black goes on to argue that even if the balancing test is used, the rights
of the dissenting lawyers should weigh much heavier on the scales than
S6. The balancing test is well ilustrated by its application by the majority, and Mr.
Justice Black's opposition to it is eloquently enunciated in his dissents in the following cas s:
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 259-62 (1961) (dissenting opinion); Communint Party
of the United States v Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 137, 147-69 (1961)
(dissenting opinion); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. S2, 110-12 (1961) (dissenting opinion);
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 62-71 (1961) (dissenting opinion); Braden v. United
States, 365 U.S. 431, 441-46 (1961) (dissenting opinion); Wilkinson v. United States, 365
U.S. 399, 422-23 (1961) (dissenting opinion); Uphaus v. Wyman, 364 U.S. 38,3, 392-93
(1960) (dissenting opinion) ; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. IG9, 140-45 (1959) (dissenting opinion); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 445-53 (1950)
(dissenting opinion).
87. See note SS infra.
88. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. at S72-74 (dissenting opinion). (Emphasis added.)
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any state interest in compulsory contributions to the bar's political
program. This is a double-barreled argument to which Mr. Justice
Black has referred on several occasions, including Barenblatt v. United
States, 9 where he argued first, that the balancing test should not be
employed because the first amendment liberties are absolute, but second,
that even if the test were to be applied the Court had misapplied it
in weighing against society's interest in self-preservation merely the
individual's interest in self-expression, when the real competing interest
was that of society itself in free speech. Here he argued that even if the
balancing test is used, the interest in total freedom of the individual
lawyers of Wisconsin far outweighs any imaginary state interest in
compelling them to pay money to support views they abhor. It has been
recently contended that Mr. Justice Black's alternative view makes
far more sense than his primary emphasis on the absolute right of
free speech. In other words, we should recognize that the right of
free speech is relative to other interests, but that the burden should
always rest on those seeking to sustain any infringement of speech."
At first blush, this sounds like a reasonable view. Few persons raised in
the tolerant, easygoing American tradition feel comfortable in asserting
their allegiance to any rigid legal "absolute," even though that absolute
be enshrined in the Constitution. Yet, as a practical matter, it is a fact
that those who support the balancing test are the very same people who
almost invariably find freedom to be outweighed in the balance. A
test that appears moderate and impartial on its face, yet the authority
of which is almost never invoked except as justification for the suppression of freedom, would seem to be more of an excuse for a result already determined, than a meaningful tool to determine the result in
the first place.9 1
89. 360 U.S. 109, 144-45 (1959) (dissenting opinion) (authority of House Un-American
Activities Committee to inquire into witness' past and present Communist affiliations sustained).
90. In effect, this is suggested by Bachrach, who advocates a "balance of interest" test.
Bachrach, The Supreme Court, Civil Liberties, and the Balance of Interest Doctrine, 14 W.
Pol. Q. 391, 395, 399 (1961). He believes this to have been Mr. Justice Frankfurter's test In
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957) (concurring opinion), that it was In
fact applied in Uphaus v. Wyman, 364 U.S. 388 (1960), and Barenblatt v. United States,
supra note 89, and that it is apparently followed by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr.
Justice Brennan, although they, unlike Mr. Justice Frankfurter, usually conclude that the
"balance of interest" lies with freedom rather than restraint.
91. It is all a question of which way you lean. The mere statement of a "balancing" test
sounds reasonable in the extreme. The trouble is that it seems to predispose its disciples to
an antilibertarian spirit. When they apply the test in this spirit the result is a foregone
conclusion.

1963]

MAJORITARIAN DEMOCRACY

VI.

REiDY

A. ProportionalRestitution of Dues
From the practical standpoint, this is the toughest problem of all.
The Georgia court's remedy was to enjoin defendants perpetually "'from
enforcing the said union shop agreements . . . and from discharging
petitioners, or any member of the class they represent, for refusing to become or remain members of, or pay periodic dues . .. to, any of the
labor union defendants . . .
and to declare that the complaining
employees who had paid under protest were entitled to repayment of
their dues in full. The Supreme Court, however, adopted a far more
restrained approach. The Court felt that, even applied to dissenting
members, it was not the union shop agreement, itself, that was unlawful;
all that was illegal was the expenditure of plaintiffs' dues for politics
over their objection. The Court apparently viewed the Georgia remedy
as one that would burn down the barn to roast the pig, since in an
effort to prevent a small percentage of plaintiffs' money from being
spent for political objectives, it forbids the collection of any and all dues
money from any member opposed to the political expenditures. In the
Supreme Court's view, this would frustrate the basic congressional
policy to permit all employees benefitted by collective bargaining to
share in its costsY3
The Court suggested that there were at least two more moderate
remedies: (1) injunction against union expenditures for political purposes of an amount equal to the complaining member's proportion of
the union's planned political expenses;0 4 (2) restitution to the complaining member of his share of dues money spent for politics.° Moreover,
even these modest remedies were available only to those employees
who have made known to the union their objections in advance of
the political expenditures. Hence this was not a "class" action, and
the state decree was in error in running in favor of the alleged class
purportedly represented by plaintiffs, a class spread over the entire
eastern United States, and whose members had not even objected to
97
the union's political expenditures.
92. International Ass'n of Mlachinists v. Street, 215 Ga. 27, 3S, 103 S.E.2d 796, -03
(1959).
93. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. at 772.
94. Id. at 774-75.
95. Id. at 775.
96. Ibid.
97. Id. at 774.
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B. One Hundred Per Cent Restitution of Dues
Justices Black 8 and Whittaker"0 agreed with the Georgia court that
the objecting workers should be repaid all their dues, with interest.'00
They felt that the proposed remedies of proportional relief were impractical because of the extremely difficult accounting problems involved.
Proportional relief would require microscopic analysis of the voluminous
accounting records of local, national and international unions. Local
unions collect the dues, use a portion for political purposes, but turn over
another part to the national union which, in turn, spends a portion for
politics. The proportional remedy might require so many special
masters, accountants and lawyers that it would cost far more to
administer than the amounts sought to be recovered. In fact, at the
conclusion of this exercise in higher mathematics the worker's claim
might well be dismissed as de minimis anyway.'
Moreover, Mr. Justice Whittaker pointed out that it is virtually impossible to draw a clear judicial line between proscribed "political"
activity and permissible negotiation and administration of collective
bargaining agreements. 2 Certainly no one would question the difficulty
of distinguishing between "political" and "nonpolitical" union activity.
Money contributed directly to a candidate or political party presents
a clear case, but what about union "educational" programs, or union
literature that presents a candidate's record without directly endorsing
or opposing him, but with a clear implication of where the union stands?
Indeed, what of a direct political endorsement in a union newspaper?
Is the dissenter entitled to some kind of proportional restitution if dues
money is used to finance the paper? If so, how do you figure it? What of
purportedly nonpartisan voter registration drives when everyone knows
that at least seventy-five per cent of the unregistered union members
will register with the Democratic Party and will overwhelmingly
support the official union political line? 0 3
98. Id. at 796 (dissenting opinion).
99. Id. at 780 (separate opinion).
100. However, Mr. Justice Black did not fully support the Georgia decree, for he agreed

with the majority that this was not a proper class action. He also felt that the state decree
should be modified to make clear that it did not forbid employees from voluntarily contributing to a collective fund to finance political activity, even though the individual might
not always agree with the group's choices as to which candidates and causes to support.
101. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. at 796 (dissenting opinion).
Cf. note 50 supra.
102. Id. at 779-80 (separate opinion).
103. AFL-CIO President, George Meany, announcing a $500,000 allotment for a "nonpartisan" drive to register union members, their families and neighbors, declared: "I'm of
the opinion that for every four labor people we get to register, at least three of them would
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For that matter, what of union activity in many other controversial
areas? Suppose a union were to sponsor an exhibition of modernistic
art as a civic contribution. Suppose further that some of the union
members object on the ground that the pictures convey a Communistic
and antireligious message. What if they demand a proportional restitution of their dues used to finance the exhibit, on the grounds that it
offends both their political and religious convictions? Perhaps the
union's art sponsorship would fall under the doctrine of ultra vires, yet
in corporate law this doctrine has practically become a museum piece.,"
It can surely be argued that sponsoring an art exhibit would improve
the union's public image, just as many a similar corporate charitable
contribution is justified by the same rationale."°
Beyond a doubt, any scheme of proportional restitution will be hard
pressed to hurdle the twin obstacles of accounting impediments and conceptual confusion over just what is political activity. Mloreover, there
are doubtless at least a few unions where the worker will be strongly
discouraged from seeking any proportional exemption. This discouragement will ordinarily take the relatively mild form of social disapproval
or ostracism; but occasionally it might conceivably reach the point of
physical violence or threats thereof.
However, if proportional remedies seem unworkable, one hundred per
cent recovery of dues might well open a pandora's box full of even more
horrendous problems. Is not the one hundred per cent recovery in reality
a judicially legislated open shop for a chosen few? Would it not embroil
the Court in the political dispute between voluntary and compulsory
unionism? A one hundred per cent recovery means, in effect, that even in
a union shop those workers who object to the union's political activities
need not pay any union dues. Perhaps they may even enjoy the advantages of both voluntary and compulsory unionism-at least neither
Justices Black nor Whittaker nor the Georgia court suggest that upon
refund of all their dues the complaining members necessarily lose their
privileges of union membership, such as voting in union elections or
holding union office. In any event, the dissenters would not have to pay
any dues, while everyone else would be compelled to do so. Let us reflect
for a moment upon the discrimination thus involved. If a person objects
vote consistent with the policies of the trade union movement in regard to Congrr Aional
candidates and others, and vote on the basis of their records on legislation in which we are
interested." N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1960, p. 16, col. 7.
104. Baker & Cary, Cases on Corporations 350 (3d ed. abr. 1959).
105. Although some states still impose some restrictions on corporate gifts to charity,
many statutes specifically authorize them (id. at 359) and the current trend is definitely
in favor of their validity. This is well illustrated by A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barloiv, 13 N.J.
145, 98 A.2d 581 (1953), sustaining a corporate gift to Princeton University.
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to the union's political line, even though he has no objection to compulsory unionism in principle, he would not have to pay dues. On the other
hand, one who has no objection to the union's politics, but who is
simply strongly opposed to the idea of being compelled to belong to
anything, must pay his dues in full. How can we justify such special
favor of those who object to a relatively small portion of union activity
when we concede nothing to those who oppose the whole concept of
compulsory unionism? 1°6
It can well be argued that if we want voluntary unionism, we should
apply it across-the-board to everyone rather than piecemeal to just a
few, and that it should be imposed, if at all, by the legislature or by the
people, not by the judiciary. At least proportiondl relief has the shining
virtue of maintaining the constitutional principle of political individualism, 0 7 while leaving the separate issue of voluntary versus compulsory unionism, basically a social and economic, rather than a constitutional civil-liberties question, to the decision of the customary political
processes.' 08
C. Injunction Against All Union PoliticalExpenditures
On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Georgia
Supreme Court directed the trial court to receive evidence to determine
how much money the union had spent for politics.
106. Moreover, there is a standing invitation to perjury and fraud if all one need do to
avoid payment of any dues whatever is to file an affidavit stating one's political disagreement with the union. On the other hand, if the dissenter's remedy is merely proportional,
the temptation to fraud is but slight since the amounts involved are not large and the issue
then is not money but principle.
107. Yet, the difficulties in administering proportional relief are undeniable. Probably
experience will tell whether such a remedy is workable. If it is not, another look at 100%
restitution will be in order, since the constitutional principle is too basic to be lost for want
of a remedy.
108. The author has never favored the so-called "right-to-work" laws, outlawing the
union shop. However, the dilemma of proportional relief versus a judicially legislated open
shop for the dissenters, neither of which really appeal to the practical mind, only points
up the uneasy legal and moral quandaries in which we are inescapably entangled when we
compel membership in a powerful organization with virtual life-and-death power over the
individual's economic livelihood, and an expanding interest in practically every phase of Its
members' lives. It may well be that in our complex industrial civilization compulsory
unionism is philosophically justifiable as a means of raising the worker's bargaining power
to his employer's level, thus guaranteeing the worker an economically feasible freedom of
choice, although at the expense of his legalistic freedom of choice over whether or not to
join the union. Nonetheless, the existence of a great many pressures toward union conformity is undeniable. This is all the more reason why liberals who normally support
organized labor should bend over backwards to protect the individual worker from the
excesses of the union majority.
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Should the trial court be able to determine whose money is spent for what.., and
how the plaintiffs can be saved from harm by any withdrawal from the general fund
for political purposes, and be able to formulate a practical method which would
afford the relief . . . which . . . is due the plaintiffs, then that court is directed to
enter a decree accordingly. However, should the trial court be unable to determine
a method practical in performance ... then it should... [enjoin] the unions from
spending any monies for political purposes.'00

The Georgia court appears skeptical of the practicality of the suggested proportional remedies, and almost seems to be inviting a blanket

injunction against all union political expenditures. Such an injunction
would be patently unconstitutional. As indicated previously,1n the federal
law prohibiting union expenditures in federal elections"" is almost certainly invalid. Furthermore, the suggested injunction would even forbid

expenditures in state and local elections. These disbursements are not
prohibited by the federal law. Thus, to a large extent, the injunction

would not even be supported by any equivalent federal prohibitions,
and would collide head-on with the union's constitutional right of political

participation. Even to the extent that such an injunction would be
coterminous with the prohibition of union expenditures in federal
elections, it seems highly doubtful that a state court would have any
jurisdiction to enforce such a federal statute. Such a means of enforcement would seem even beyond the power of a federal court since the

act makes no mention of injunctive relief. Moreover, it is a criminal
statute and equity traditionally does not enjoin the commission of a
113
crime."' Thus the whole idea is invalid.
Even if it were not invalid, it takes little imagination to envision
109. International Ass'n of Machinists ,. Street, 217 Ga. 351, 353, 122 S.E.2d 220, 222
(1961).
110. See text accompanying notes 23-35 supra.
111. 13 U.S.C. § 610 (195S).
112. de Funiak, Modem Equity § 36 (1950).
113. The Georgia court's antiunion leanings show through in another spot. Since the
Supreme Court had held, contrary to the Georgia decision, that this wras not a class action,
the Georgia court directed that all nonoperating employees be given a chance to intervene
as parties plaintiff, "and that the court in a method and manner it deems most expedient
cause written notice to be given to all such employees of their right to intervene. ... "
International Ass'n of Machinists x%Street, 217 Ga. at 353, 122 S.EX2d at 223. The court does
not bother to explain just what business a court has in stirring up litigation. One can well
imagine a Georgia court in almost any other context stiffly observing the maxim: 'it is not
the business of the court to inform potential litigants of their rights. All persons are presumed to know the law." Nor does it bother to explain how the trial court is to give notice
to thousands of employees scattered over the entire eastern United States. Nor who is to pay
for it. The union? But, this is all a tempest in a teapot since the union members haven't
objected in advance to political use of their dues, a prerequisite for recovery. International
Ass'n of lachinists v. Street, 367 U.S. at 775.
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the Supreme Court striking down such an extreme remedy as much
too excessive, and not contemplated by the Railway Labor Act. After
all, if the majority of the Court felt that one hundred per cent restitution of dues was too extreme a remedy, because it would frustrate the
purpose of the act, which is to permit all employees benefitted by collective
bargaining to share in its cost,114 what are they going to think about an
injunctive remedy that puts a halt to all union political spending just to
protect a handful of dissenters? The one hundred per cent restitution
would seem a far milder remedy." 5
D. Contracting Out-A Legislative Remedy?
Perhaps the whole problem could be solved by legislation aimed at
providing a systematic remedy for the dissenting worker. In this connection the British "contracting out" system deserves attention. A
1913 law permitted the union member to file an "exemption notice"
which would exempt him from paying that part of his dues that would
otherwise be used for politics."' The Conservative Parliament, frightened
by the general strike in 1926, changed the law from "contracting out"
to "contracting in," that is, making the individual's consent a condition
precedent to political use of his dues." 7 However, when Labor took over
after World War II, Parliament returned to the "contracting out" procedure of 1913.11 The Conservatives, long since returned to power,
have left "contracting out" alone.
In effect, the majority opinion in the Machinists case interprets the
Railway Labor Act to provide for "contracting out." "Contracting in"
is unfair in that it puts the burden on the union when the great majority
of workers have no objection to their union's political activity. It
requires a great deal of useless paper work, thereby adding to the union's
administrative overhead." 9 As Mr. Justice Brennan said: "[D]issent
114. Id. at 772.
115. Furthermore, it is not constitutionally objectionable, although somewhat disruptive
of the purpose of the union shop.
116. Trade Union Act, 1913, 2 & 3 Geo. 5, c. 30.
117. Trade Disputes & Trade Unions Act, 1927, 17 & 18 Geo. 5, c. 22.
118. Trade Disputes & Trade Unions Act, 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 52.
119. Some American unions, leaning over backwards to avoid violation of 18 U.S.C. § 610
(1958), forbidding unions "to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any"
federal election, have employed their own version of "contracting in." The union will ask its
members to sign a card authorizing expenditure of a given portion of their monthly dues
for political purposes. Thus the use of the member's dues for politics is his own voluntary
choice, thereby presumably circumventing the prohibition in § 610. See note 24 supra and accompanying text. In United States v. Warehouse & Distribution Workers, 41 CCH Lab. Cas.
1I16601 (E.D. Mo. 1960), the district court upheld this plan in acquitting four teamster
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is not to be presumed.... The union . .. should not in fairness be
subjected to sanctions in favor of an employee who makes no complaint
of the use of his money for such activities."' 2 Certainly a legislative
solution, spelling out a systematic procedure akin to Britain's "contracting out," would be far preferable to leaving the solution up to ad
hoc judicial improvisation.
VII.

CONCLUSION

There is abroad in the land an erroneous belief that liberals must
almost automatically support any action taken by organized labor. This
overlooks the very real possibility that labor, itself, may occasionally
become reactionary and untrue, either in methods or objectives, to true
liberalism. Liberals who share this belief are what the writer would
term "economic" or "welfare" liberals-their liberalism goes no deeper
than an adherence to the welfare state and a belief in the pattern of
social and economic legislation typified by the New Deal. These liberals
forget that in the final analysis no truly great or lasting philosophy can
be characterized by an attachment to the material interests of any one
social or economic group, but that such philosophy can only be immortalized by its consistent devotion to a set of high ideals that are
independent of the narrow interests of any one group.'
officials of violating § 610. However, if the member will not sign, all of his dues are used
for nonpolitical activity; he is not refunded any part of his money. Rauh, Legality of
Union Political E.enditures, 34 So. Cal. L. Rev. 152, 14 (1961).
120. 367 U.S. at 774.
121. At this point, many disciples of the Bentley-Frankfurter group process theory (se
text accompanying notes 13-22 supra) may conclude that the v.riter has been captured
by a hopelessly individualistic and unrealistic idealism. These group-oriented philosophers
may feel that the contentions of this article are too close to the individualistic, antigroup
philosophy of former American Motors President, Michigan's Governor George Romney.
Mr. Romney's philosophy apparently consists of a deep-rooted "distrust of the power
groupings in modem America, [and a] belief that broad-based citizen participation is
needed to nullify the power blocks. . . ." Novak, Rambling Romneyism, Wall Street

journal, Oct. 15, 1962, p. 12, col. 4. Although apparently basically a conservative in the
overall political spectrum, and a moderate Republican, he believes that government should
be controlled by neither business nor labor, and that the power of both chould be drastically
reduced, in part by the vigorous application of antitrust laws to both groups. His philosophy
is sometimes criticized as unrealistic, and worse yet, as incipient authoritarianism. Some
"critics see in his denunciation of economic pressure groups the denial rather than the advancement of representative democracy." Ibid. The Romney philosophy would be attractive
to Robert MacIver, who has criticized Bentley's theory as cynically antidemocratic: "To
Bentley ... a legislative act is always the calculable resultant of a struggle between prezsure
groups, never a decision between opposing conceptions of national welfare .... Nevertheless . . . the whole logic of democracy is based on the conception that there is still a national unity and a common welfare." MacIver, The Web of Government 220 (1943). On the
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To compel a man to support political causes in which he does not
believe is reactionary, not liberal. To expel a man from union affiliation
because he will not pay a special assessment to fight a "right-to-work"
law in which he strongly believes, as in DeMille v. American Fed'n of
Radio Artists,'22 bespeaks not the historic liberal tolerance of dissent,
but the traditional reactionary fear of nonconformity. Finally, to expel
a union member because he has actively campaigned in favor of a "rightto-work" law opposed by the union is but to march inexorably to the
ultimate extreme of union totalitarianism.
Justices Black and Douglas are true to the traditions of classical
liberalism in their defense of the dissenting union members and attorneys.
Although both of them are intellectually and emotionally deeply rooted
in New Deal and economic liberalism, and can by no shade of the
other hand, Dickinson would presumably be quite suspicious of a political theory
that attempts to de-emphasize the role of the interest group in democratic society, for
he denounces the concept of a mystical "popular will" as a "metaphysical specter":
"[D]emocratic ... [government], in concentrating on the realization of a supposed popular
will, is offering vain oblations to a metaphysical specter.. . . The task of government, and
hence of democracy as a form of government, is not to express an imaginary popular will,
but to effect adjustments among the various special wills . . . which at any given time are
pressing for realization. . . . [E]very governmental act can be viewed as favoring in some
degree some particular and partial 'will,' or special interest. It is therefore meaningless to
criticize government, whether democratic or not, merely because it allows special Interests
to attain some measure of what they think themselves entitled to. The question is rather
whether it allows the 'right' side, the 'right' special interest, to win; and the 'right' special
interest means only the one whose will is most compatible with what we, as critics, conceive to be the right direction for the society's development to take." Dickinson, Democratic
Realities and Democratic Dogma, 24 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 283, 291-92 (1930). The author's
position is a moderate one. There can be no doubt of the efficacy of Bentley's theory of the
group process as an analytical tool to measure what is happening and to predict what is likely
to happen. But it is morally neutral. See note 18 supra and accompanying text. There is no
particular point to be served by either denouncing it as an intellectual justification for group
selfishness, or in extolling it as the ultimate and noblest definition of democracy. The writer
finds much of the Romney philosophy attractive. It is highly attractive in its emphasis on
the rights of the individual and the need to protect the individual against the encroachments
of the group. It all depends on how far this philosophy goes and what direction it takes.
To the extent that it recognizes the rightful and inevitable role of the group in political
life, but attempts to maintain a fair balance of power between the competing groups, and to
keep any group from growing so strong that it can dominate our society, and endeavors
above all to prevent the group from swallowing up the individual, to that extent It Is the
philosophy of constitutional liberalism.
122. 31 Cal. 2d 139, 187 P.2d 769 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1948). The court
sustained the expulsion. True, DeMille was not punished for expressing his political views,
but he was indeed punished for acting upon them by refusing to support their destruction
financially. This is hardly the kind of distinction upon which to base a realistic constitutional
jurisprudence. Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1049, 1069
n.103 (1951).
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imagination be labelled as antilabor, yet both recognize that where
there is a clash, "full-belly" liberalism must give way to "civil-liberties"
liberalism.'
Indeed, as onetime "economic" liberals they obviously
recognize the relationship between control of a man's purse and control
of his thoughts and words. They know that a man's freedom of speech
is left no more unfettered by compelling him to pay money to advance
political causes to which he is opposed, than his religious freedom
remains uncompromised by compelling him to pay taxes for the support
12 4
of an established church.
Let us hope that, when the time comes for the Supreme Court to
face squarely the constitutional issue, unencumbered by problems of
common-law pleading and technical statutory interpretation, it will abide
not by the group-centered, social class orientation of "economic" liberalism, but that it will follow instead the dictates of historic, classical
liberalism, with its predominant emphasis on freedom of the individual
to make up his own mind and act on his own beliefs without coercion
123. This is not the only case in which Justices Black and Douglas have been true to
liberal ideals even though the application of those ideals was to the detriment of a group
with which liberals are usually in sympathy. In Hannah v. Larche, 363 US. 420 (19-0), the
Court held that the Civil Rights Commission, in an investigation of denial of Negroes voting rights, could validly deny to witnesses the rights of apprisal of the charges, confrontation
and cross-examination because the Commission was not prosecuting or trying persons for
crime, but existed solely to ascertain facts that might be used as a basis for legislative or
executive action. Justices Black and Douglas dissented, contending that witne-ses were
entitled to all the safeguards of procedural due process, since these investigations could lead
to criminal prosecutions and other sanctions. Id. at 493 (dissenting opinion). In Beaubarnais
v. fllinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), the Court upheld defendant's conviction for distributing
leaflets maligning the Negro race as rapists, robbers and marijuana addict,, under a criminal
group libel statute prohibiting distribution of lithographs exposing a class of citizens of any
race, color, creed or religion to contempt or making them appear to lack virtue. Justices
Black and Douglas, dissenting, denounced the statute as a deprivation of freedom of the
press. Mr. Justice Black pointed out that the same kind of a law in another area could send
one to jail for advocating racial equality. "If there be minority groups who hail this holding
as their victory, they might consider the possible relevancy of this ancient remark: 'Another
such victory and I am undone."' Id. at 275 (dissenting opinion). No one can challenge the
loyalty of justices Black and Douglas to civil rights for the Negro. Yet in Hannah and
Beauharnais they took stands that on their face were opposed to the "pro-Negro" position,
because they believed that support of civil liberties principles was more important than blind
allegiance to groups who are the usual beneficiaries of these principles.
124. Perhaps Mr. Justice Harlan enunciated a more potent argument than he realized
when he attempted to pass off his own tentative suggestion that a "state-created integrated
bar amounts to a governmental 'establishment' of political beief." Ridiculous, he replied.
Everyone must "recognize the dear distinction in the wording of the First Amendment between the protections of speech and religion, only the latter providing a protection against
'establishment.'" Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. S20, 352 (1961) (concurring opinion).

696

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

from any group endowed by government with virtual life-and-death
powers over his economic or professional well-being.
Certainly those who believe that the freedoms of the first amendment
are absolute have no alternative but to protect both the rights of the
union majority to participate in politics and the rights of the union
minority to refrain from contributing to the support of causes in which
they cannot believe. Even if the balancing-of-interests test is to be applied
to these problems, the same results should obtain. Surely there is no
compelling social interest in forbidding union political activity, or political
activity by any group. Yet neither is there any compelling social interest
in forcing dissenting members of any group to contribute to political
causes which they abhor. All of the social and individual interests here
lie in one direction-freedom for the majority to act; freedom of the
minority from coercion.

